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Bruce Knapman
This paper is a rt;:vision and update of an earlier article on the economic
consequences of the I987 military coups d'etat in Fiji (Knapman I988a). Its
purpose is to explain what has happened against a background analysis of
postindependence development, and to predict what is likely to happen. It
is not prescriptive, but it does comment on the universalist, promarket,
antistate analysis and policy recommendations in two recent books on the
Fiji economy (Cole and Hughes I988; Kasper, Bennett, and Blandy I988).
The conclusion is that Fiji probably faces a future of economic stagnation.
DEVELOPMENT ISSUES AND PERFORMANCE I970-1986
In I874, at the beginning of the colonial period, Fiji's largely self-sufficient
subsistence economy supported a population of about I40,000 Fijians
who tolerated a shaky frontier economy of less than 2000 white settlers
and traders. By I970, at the end of the colonial period, Fiji had an export
economy supporting a population of 480,000. Of these, 200,000 were
indigenous land-owning Fijians, 76 percent of whom lived in rural villages
and retained a significant commitment to subsistence agriculture and neo-
traditional society. Another 24°,000 were Indians, 6I percent of whom
lived in rural areas: they were predominantly Fiji-born (therefore "Indo-
Fijian"), grew the principal export crop (sugarcane) on leased land, and
were prominent in small-scale commercial and service enterprises. The
remaining, almost entirely urban, population consisted of Europeans and
Chinese who dominated the management of largely foreign-owned big
business in the manufacturing (mainly sugar milling), banking, trade, and
tourism sectors (Knapman I987, I; CES, July I988; Fisk I970, 36-42).
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The average income of the population was high by poor-country stan-
dards because of high sugar and subsistence-sector productivity levels, but
it concealed important disparities. Urban income per person was roughly
double rural income per person; consistent with the ethnic pattern of eco-
nomic activity, surveys of income tax returns suggested that Fijians earned
60 percent of average income, whereas Indo-Fijians received 80 percent,
Chinese II5 percent, and Europeans 140 percent (Fiji CPO 1970,12). There
were rich Indo-Fijians and Fijians, but the conspicuous fact remained that
the involvement of Fijians in the modern economy was not commensurate
with their political power. From the outset, the new nation's policymakers
and planners had to confront a growth-distribution conflict with a poten-
tially problematic ethnic dimension. Growth in the modern sector was
necessary in order to provide jobs and meet the aspirations of a popula-
tion that had been increasing at over 3 percent annually (CES, July 1988);
but the faster that growth, the more the neotraditional sector would lag
behind in relative terms, and the greater the risk of envy and unrest. One
observer identified the distribution rather than the size of national income
as "the most vital and urgent problem" confronting Fiji, and advocated
government intervention aimed at accelerating Fijian participation in the
modern sector, even if some growth had to be sacrificed (Fisk 1970, I, 62).
Reduction of income disparities was specified as "perhaps the most
important single objective" of the first postindependence five-year devel-
opment plan (Fiji CPO 1970, 19). The disparities were seen in urban-rural
rather than explicitly ethnic terms but, contrary to statements by Cole and
Hughes (1988, 3), some policy action aimed specifically at promoting
greater Fijian involvement in the cash economy was undertaken. A
National Marketing Authority was set up in 1971, the Fijian Affairs Board
made loans available to established Fijian sugarcane farmers, half the sug-
arcane farmers participating in the Seaqaqa settlement scheme were to be
Fijians, a western Viti Levu pine scheme was initiated, 50 percent of terti-
ary scholarships were reserved for Fijians, and in 1975 a Business Oppor-
tunity and Management Advisory Services Scheme was established to
facilitate loan applications to the Fiji Development Bank and to assist the
relatively few Fijians established in the business community (Lasaqa 1984,
89,100, II7-II8, 124, 139). However limited in its range and effectiveness
this action may appear in retrospect, it was not inconsequential. Perhaps
of greater importance to the evolving political economy of Fiji, it was
matched by an Alliance government policy of ethnic balance in the public
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sector (Lal 1988, 14). These policies were to supplement the (more signifi-
cant) impact of growth itself on Fijians' opportunities and responses in the
modern sector.
From a different perspective, Fijians faced a development dilemma.
Beyond the point of discretionary and supplementary involvement in the
cash economy, the "path of money" and the "way of the land" went in dif-
ferent directions (Knapman and Walter 1980). Thrift and acquisitiveness
were recognized as "essential components of Fijian progress in the modern
world," yet were also seen as a threat to the chiefly system that was the
backbone of the communal, sharing neotraditional society (Lasaqa 1984,
33). This society in turn, aside from being valued in its own right, was seen
as the only protection against a perceived threat of Indo-Fijian domination
(Nayacakalou 1975, 138).
How, then, were the demands of modernity and tradition or protection
to be reconciled? At the ideological level, the answer had been simply to
deny that there was a conflict: individualism could be grafted onto the tra-
ditional culture. For Nayacakalou though, Fijians could not "change and
preserve the same thing at the same time.... The belief that they can do
both simultaneously is a monstrous nonsense" (1975, 135). He went on to
note, portentously in view of Rabuka's successful appeal to traditional
values and culture in 1987, that the belief would be hard to eradicate, but
that there were already suggestions from some Fijians that the ideology
served only to maintain the chiefs' positions of privilege. These sugges-
tions referred to the response to the question of how to reconcile the con-
flicting demands, namely that a colonially constituted chiefly ruling group
of politicians and bureaucrats would do their duty, that is, "mediate for
the people of the land, and shield them from capitalist economic forces
and relations" (Kaplan 1988, 104). This did not preclude so much as
encourage the use of the power of the state to influence the allocation of
resources and the distribution of economic opportunities in favor of
(some) Fijians. Nor did it preclude the contemplation of stronger interven-
tion to elevate Fijians in the nation's commercial life: "Perhaps certain
areas of commercial activity ought to be reserved for Fijians" (Lasaqa
1984,139).
In the event, and whatever the concerns over distribution, the first plan
set an ambitious target of 6.7 percentaverage annual real growth in gross
domestic product (GOP) for 1971-1975-and came close to achieving it.
The actual rate was 5.9 percent; and, because declining fertility and
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Table I. Growth and Inflation in Fiji, 1970-1988
Gross domestic product
Per person Inflation
Year % % %
1971 6.0 3.6 6.5
1972 7.9 5.7 9.1
1973 12.7 10.3 11.2
1974 2.6 1.0 14,4
1975 .1 -1.8 13.1
1976 2.7 1.1 11.2
1977 4,4 2.6 7.3
1978 1.8 0.0 6.1
1979 12.0 9.6 8.3
1980 -1.7 -3.7 14.5
1981 6.0 3.9 11.2
1982 -1.1 -2.9 7.0
1983 -4.0 -5.9 6.8
1984 8,4 6.2 5.3
1985 -4.6 -6.2 4,4
1986 8.8 6.2 1.8
1987 -7.8" -8,4" 9.5
1988 -2.5" -4.0" 11.0t
Sources: Current Economic Statistics, July 1988; Browne and
Scott 1989, 49; Fiji Central Planning Office 1975, 1985;
Pacific Islands Monthly, January 1989.
Notes: ('Official provisional estimates.
tAnnual rate at July 1988.
largely Indo-Fijian emigration had caused population growth to decline to
less than 2 percent annually, growth in income per person reached 4 per-
cent (Table I). This success was primarily due to the continued, foreign-
financed expansion of tourism and the associated construction boom in
1971-1973, which were slowed by the 1974-75 world recession. The reces-
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sion's impact on the balance of payments was mitigated by a very rapid
rise in sugar export prices; but the 1973-74 oil-price hike gave an energy-
cost push to an inflation rate that had begun accelerating earlier because
of worldwide inflation, domestic credit expansion, domestic food price
rises due to a 1972 hurricane, and defensive money wage increases
(Table I).
A prices and incomes policy in force from April 1973 to March 1975 may
have dampened inflationary pressures temporarily, but failed to cause a
fundamental downward revision of the inflation rate expected by orga-
nized labor, and failed to prevent the consequent increases in money wage
rates (Fiji CPO 1975, 35-36). Those increases were so substantial as to lead
to a real wage and salary rate rise averaging 5.2 percent annually from
1971 to 1975 (Bienefeld 1984, 221). Notably, the nominal average salary of
civil servants almost trebled during a period when the consumer price
index increased 67 percent (World Bank 1977, 41, Table 7.3). Unemploy-
ment therefore rose, and the gap between urban and rural incomes wid-
ened, stimulating substantial migration from cane-cutting areas and the
eastern islands coconut economy. Importantly, the proportion of Fijians
living in urban areas in 1976 had risen to 30 percent-from 24 percent in
1966 and II percent in 1956 (Ward 1987,35).
The second postindependence development plan (1976-1980) reaf-
firmed a commitment to growth with redistribution, conveying compla-
cency in the statemertt that "Over the last ten years it has been discovered
that aggregate economic growth per se is not difficult to achieve" (Fiji CPO
1975,5), and setting a correspondingly ambitious real GDP growth target
of 7.3 percent annually. The actual rate turned out to be 3.5 percent
which, with the annual population growth rate at about two percent,
translated into 1.5 percent per person (Table I). Sugar production
expanded strongly because of improved yields and public investment in a
one-third extension of the cultivated area. Consequently, although the
export price fell 29 percent in 1976, remained low in the following three
years, and in 1980 was still just below its 1975 level, the value of sugar
exports grew at an annual average of 16 percent (Browne and Scott 1989,
40,56). The government sector expanded rapidly too, with public invest-
-ffient in forestry, fisheries, and hydroelectricity as well as sugar, and con-
tinued growth in current spending (responsibly financed out of taxation
revenue). But tourist arrivals increased at only 3.3 percent per year instead
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of the predicted 10 percent, with obvious implications for associated
growth rates in the building and construction, transport, wholesale and
retail trade, finance and real estate sectors (CES, July 1981).
Also worrying, especially in view of the early seventies experience, was
the impact of the 1978-79 oil price on an inflation rate that had been
brought down between 1975 and 1978 by exemplary macroeconomic man-
agement (Table I; Cole and Hughes 1988, 8-16). Steps taken included the
use of a Tripartite Forum made up of government, employers, and unions
to set wage guidelines that kept nominal wage rate increases tied to past-
declining-inflation rates (Browne and Scott 1989, 40-41). Real wages
and salaries increased at an annual average rate of 1.3 percent, just below
the rate for GDP per person (Bienefeld 1984, 221).
With regard to income distribution, relative rural incomes rose because
of growth in the sugar sector and urban wage restraint. The publicly
owned Fiji Sugar Corporation had taken over from the Australian-owned
Colonial Sugar Refining Company monopoly in 1973; organized an
expansion in which Fijians had a major involvement through Seaqaqa,
and which absorbed 40 percent of new entrants to the labor market in the
period 1976 to 1980; and presided over an increase in the growers' share of
sugar income from the 58 percent of the sixties to 71 percent (Brookfield
1987,50-51). As a result of Fijians' participation at Seaqaqa and a note-
worthy increase in their share of salaried work, the gap between average
incomes of Fijians and Indo-Fijians was closing in the late seventies (Biene-
feld 1984, xxiii, 338). An ethnic dimension to the pattern of economic
activity remained discernible, in tourism for example (Britton 1987, 85),
and Fijians were still "seriously under-represented" in business, which was
the preserve of expatriate Europeans and a small section of the Indo-Fijian
community (Bienefeld 1984, xxiv, 343). Yet social differentiation by class
rather than ethnicity was clearly a phenomenon of growing importance
and, as Ward noted, was reinforced by developments in rural areas: "The
spread of wage employment into rural areas, including native Fijian vil-
lages; the weakening of customary forms of labour organisation; the
growing emphasis on private ownership; the emergence of greater income
differentiation; and the likely restriction in opportunities in agriculture are
all tending to increase the similarities in both Fijian and Indian communi-
ties" (1987, 44). While the skewed distribution of rents from communal
lands and business involvement made some chiefs "very wealthy," 59 per-
cent of the 1979 claimants for the destitutes' allowance introduced with
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Indo-Fijians in mind were in fact Fijians, most of whom were in rural
areas (Ward 1987, 43-44). There were 3000 of them in 1977, compared to
1500 in 1970, and none in 1959 (Lasaqa 1984, 29). More generally, limited
data suggested that the distribution of personal income became more
unequal, the share in national income of the poorest 10 percent of the pop-
ulation falling "considerably" in the late seventies (Fiji CPO 1985, 4). For
these people, as for the nation, economic circumstances in the 1980s were
to worsen.
The 1981-1985 development plan set a target of 4.7 percent annual aver-
age growth in real GOP, but only 0.9 percent was achieved. With popula-
tion growing at around 2 percent, this meant an average yearly decline in
real output per person of I percent (Table I). The poor performance was
very much the result of a combination of international recession with nat-
ural disasters. Fiji's net barter terms of trade in 1985 were 26 percent down
on the 1980 level, largely reflecting a decline in the sugar export price; hur-
ricanes and drought in 1983 and 1985 caused serious declines in sugar pro-
duction that coincided with falls in tourist arrivals. In consequence, Fiji's
capacity to import, as measured by its income terms of trade, fell 25 per-
cent and forced the use in 1985 of the International Monetary Fund's Com-
pensatory Financing Facility for balance of payments support (Knapman
1988a, 167). Additionally, international real interest rates had reached his-
torically unprecedented heights (Gordon 1987, 23), discouraging reinvest-
ment of profits and new overseas borrowing by resident foreign business,
and encouraging domestic capital outflow: private real investment, which
accounted for just under half of all investment in 1981-1985, was down 22
percent on its 1980 level in 1985. The fall was compounded by a 51 percent
drop in investment by public enterprises and government (calculated from
data in Browne and Scott 1989, 47, 50, and Cole and Hughes 1988, 98).
The slump in public enterprise investment could be largely attributed to
the lowered profitability caused by low sugar prices in the case of the Fiji
Sugar Corporation, and rising fuel costs in the case of fishing and airline
operations (Browne and Scott 1989, 42), though poor management may
have made things worse, especially in the latter instance. The slump in
investment by government itself was caused largely by domestic develop-
ments-specifically those in the politically difficult area of wages policy.
The government's outlay on wages and salaries more than doubled
between 1980 and 1984 because of the effect on average earnings of contin-
ued indexation to inflation, wages drift due to automatic increments, pro-
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motions and regradings of an aging public service, and pay increases won
in I983-84 by the public service union, which covered about one-third of
workers in paid, formal sector employment (ibid, 52; Bienefeld I984, 324-
333; Howard I987, II5-II7). With interest payments on the public debt
also increasing rapidly, and revenue growth relatively sluggish, real public
saving fell 69 percent, necessitating increased domestic borrowing and a
cutback in the capital expenditure program, and threatening a squeeze on
development-promoting operating expenditures in health, education, and
agriculture.
Only the obtuse would deny that the increase in civil servants' average
earnings during a period of recession shifted a disproportionately large
share of the adjustment burden onto that half of the workforce which was
not unionized, including rural workers and the unemployed. There was a
clear trade-off between average earnings and employment in the public
sector. The rise in earnings exacerbated balance of payments difficulties
by making the creation of domestic credit necessary. Yet in retrospect,
while a realignment of civil servants' real incomes with average national
income was in order, the manner in which it was brought about, and the
accompanying monetary contraction, were avoidably draconian. In the
budget handed down in November I984, a wage freeze was announced
that signaled the government's effective abandonment of the Tripartite
Forum and was to last throughout I985; and the money supply (both MI
and M3) rose less than 3 percent in I985 (RBF I987a, 54; RBF I988, Table I).
Much of the rationale for an overall freeze, as opposed to the Fiji Employ-
ment and Development Mission's recommended freezing of annual incre-
ments and continued award of salary increases within the Tripartite
guidelines (Bienefeld I984, 334), came from an IMF report that made an
assertion repeated by Browne and Scott: "If wages had moved in line with
real national income adjusted for the terms of trade during I98I-84, they
would have been about I5 percent lower at the end of I984" (I989, 43). But
calculations from adjusted real GDP data in Cole and Hughes (I988, I39)
show a I percent fall in total GDP during this period, which translates into
a 9 percent fall in per capita income given annual population growth at 2
percent. And because there was a negligible difference between GDP and
GNP growth rates (Cole and Hughes I988, 99), the public sector wage
adjustment needed was not as large as it appeared to be. Nonetheless, a
"cold turkey," not a gradualist, contraction was put in place-and contrib-
uted to the largest negative growth rate since independence (Table I).
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The restrictive stance of macroeconomic policy also prompted the with-
drawal of the Fiji Trades Union Congress from the Forum and provided a
strong stimulant to the associated formation of a Fiji Labour Party by
mid-1985 (Robertson and Tamanisau 1988, 24). In the following eighteen
months this party drew growing support from disenchanted Indo-Fijian
supporters of the National Federation Party and educated, urbanized
Indo-Fijians and Fijians who saw the Alliance government as an eastern
chiefly aristocracy in a patron-client relationship with some rich European
and Indo-Fijian businessmen, essentially "neopatrimonial" in that it was
"based on the personal domination of an individual leader, who uses the
country's resources primarily as loot for rewarding his loyal followers"
(Leys 1987, 45). In fact, an accountable Alliance government had accom-
plished a great deal more, with a longer-term view, and with the assistance
of a more honest and efficient bureaucracy, than this perception might
imply. But there is no doubt that the state, to paraphrase Beckman (1988,
27), had been penetrated by personalized relations based on communal
and big-business ties, and that some opportunities for personal enrich-
ment had been grasped and favoritism practiced (Robertson and Tamani-
sau 1988, 48-51; Scarr 1988, 43-48). The opportunities included those
provided by the government's post-1975 interventionist microeconomic
policies (Cole and Hughes 1988, 3-8), especially the attempted promotion
of inherently monopolistic import-substituting industries through tariff
protection and import licensing. These open the door to potential corrup-
tion, encouraging as they do rent-seeking behavior by big business at the
expense of little business. Notable in this context was the garment indus-
try, which attracted protection so high as to effectively more than double
the price of competitive imports while continuing to exhibit antediluvian
working conditions (Bienefeld 1984, 510; Robertson and Tamanisau 1988,
28). It was a major target of the Labour Party, which also alleged misman-
agement of statutory corporations, including those aimed at accelerating
Fijian involvement in the modern economy, and generally took advantage
of the 1985 socioeconomic decline.
As it happened, international and reinforcing domestic developments
aided-or ought to have aided-the stocks of the Alliance in 1986, at least
insofar as the state of the economy was a determinant. An oil-price drop
coupled with higher sugar and gold prices significantly improved Fiji's
terms of trade; sugar production reached a record high that made full use
of available milling capacity; tourism receipts were up as a record number
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of visitors arrived; the inflation rate was down to 1.8 percent; and the bal-
ance of payments on current account moved into surplus, raising official
reserves to six months' imports and permitting a repayment of the I985 IMF
loan (RBF I987a, I4, I9). Public investment also rose substantially, imply-
ing heavy reliance on domestic borrowing since revenue and current
expenditure were stagnant as a result of direct tax concessions and cuts in
goods and services spending, respectively. The cuts offset the effects of a
2.25 percent wage rise, which was awarded on the basis of changes in the
price level, real GOP, and the terms of trade (Browne and Scott I989, 44,
47,50-52; RBF I987a, 54). Overall, real GOP was up 8.8 percent on the I985
figure. The per capita figure was 6.2 percent (Table I).
This growth only compensated for the arithmetically equal I985
decline, and there were issues of ongoing concern. Aggregate real private
investment remained stagnant, prompting an easing of monetary policy in
late I986 (Browne and Scott I989, 47; RBF I987a, 2I). Open unemploy-
ment was running at 7.6 percent of the economically active population of
24I,000. The rate for the I43,000-strong rural component was 4.6 per-
cent, whereas the rate for the urban component was I1.9 percent. The
respective figures for the major ethnic groups were 7.6, 3.5, and I5.7 per-
cent for Fijians, and 7.6, 5.9, and 8.2 percent for Indo-Fijians (calculated
from Fiji Bureau of Statistics I988b, Table I7). Clearly, and crucially for
political developments, the unemployment rate among the 33 percent of
the Fijian population living in urban areas was almost double that of Indo-
Fijians. Equally significant was the fact that 7I percent of Indo-Fijian
urban unemployed, and 72 percent of Fijian urban unemployed, were in
the I5-24 age group. Many of these young people were driven to begging
and stealing and were also, in Lewis' vivid phrase, "the shock troops of
political discontent" (Lewis I966, 86). A major challenge for the rest of the
twentieth century would be to find jobs for them before they became
unemployable, as well as for the 6000-plus net increase in the workforce
expected each year (Fiji CPO I985, 28). Given annual productivity growth
of around 1.5 percent, such labor force growth (of 2.4 percent annually)
implied that a growth of about 4 percent in GOP was necessary just to hold
the line on the unemployment rate (Bienefeld I984, ix).
Another continuing challenge was the familiar one of accelerating pro-
ductive Fijian participation in the modern economy, as opposed to unpro-
ductive participation through membership of the urban unemployment
pool. Unfortunately, the I986 census volume on economic characteristics
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of the Fiji population has not been published, precluding detailed compar-
isons of the situations in I970 and I986. There is no doubt, however, that
beyond employment in the public service, little had been achieved by way
of getting greater Fijian representation in commercial and professional
economic activity, despite preferential development bank financing of
budding Fijian entrepreneurs and the reservation of 50 percent of tertiary
education scholarships for Fijians (Cole and Hughes I988, 22-23; Lal
I988, I5-I6). At base this was because the contradiction between the
demands of neotradition and modernity identified by Nayacakalou re-
mained unresolved. As a prominent Alliance politician, Ratu David
Toganivalu, observed: "The single most important problem is a Fijian's
mental attitude and approach to business. He starts with a great liability
in that he has a cultural heritage that is not really conducive to frugality
and material acquisition" (quoted in Lal I988, I7). Cultural change cannot
be engineered overnight. The Labour Party blamed the chiefs for keeping
commoners cocooned in the communal system while reaping the benefits
of their own involvement in the modern economy (Robertson and
Tamanisau I988, 32-34).
After sixteen years of Alliance government rule, the nation still faced
the same development challenges it had faced at independence-to grow,
to provide employment, and to accelerate Fijian integration into the cash
economy so that rising aspirations could be met. This is only to say that
development was an ongoing process; it is not to imply that no progress
had been made. Average real income had increased at an annual com-
pound rate of 2 percent in the period I970 to I986 (from data in Cole and
Hughes I988, 94). In other words, the size of the national cake had
increased by 88 percent, permitting a 36 percent increase in the size of the
average slice despite a 38 percent rise in population. The share of the cake
for private consumption had increased to 60 percent. Water and power
supplies, transport, and communications had been improved. Advances
had been made in the provision of education, health, and housing. Yet
growth had been sluggish since the late seventies, leaving real income per
person in I986 just 6 percent above the I977 level, and the unemployment
rate had gone up. As Ratu Mara observed in the final Alliance election
broadcast of 3 April I987, "The economy must grow.... If not, the cake
will not be bigger and the many needs-the growing needs will not be
met" (quoted in Lal I988, I54).
In this respect, the immediate outlook was mildly encouraging. In the
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first quarter of 1987 sugar export revenue was up enormously. Gold reve-
-nue was up, and so were gross tourism receipts as a result of a 9 percent
increase in visitors who stayed longer and spent more than in the previous
year. The government's budget position was improving. The inflation rate
seemed to have stabilized at a low level. Interest rates had fallen; and
though building and construction activity was down, net imports of
machinery and transport equipment were up 66 percent (RBF 1987b). Even
so, and despite expectations of continued buoyancy, the Reserve Bank
forecast, perhaps conservatively, an annual expansion in real GDP of only
1.4 percent.
For some economists, who think in terms of a dichotomy or even a con-
flict between state and market, such slow growth was only to be expected.
"Fiji is a heavily protected and regulated economy ... it is quite clear that
the sluggish growth of the late 1970S and 1980s in substantial degree
resulted from the intensity of regulation and the resulting burdens of the
private sector" (Cole and Hughes 1988, 34). "Fiji's economic development
philosophy and macroeconomic management style has [sic] been essen-
tially statist ... past economic management ... laid the basis for a rela-
tively poor economic performance" (Kasper, Bennett, and Blandy 1988,
27, 32). "Most importantly, the rampant interventionism by the visible
hand of the bureaucracy has emotionalized and politicized economic life
and stifled economic growth" (Kasper 1989,10). Without wishing to deny
them any relevance, these are ideologically driven arguments based on the
application of a universalist market-economy model that, by itself, is
bound to generate simplistic and unconvincing stories. In theory and in
practice governments can, through strategic intervention in situations
where the market gives the wrong signals, raise the rate of growth above
what it would otherwise have been, and ensure achievement of objectives
other than faster growth. Such intervention can include the fostering of
better markets. Though in Fiji some intervention was costly and counter-
productive, particularly the creation of an inefficient protection system to
encourage an extremely small manufacturing sector, on balance it seems
to me to have made a positive contribution, primarily through the provi-
sion of public goods and infrastructure and the promotion of saving and
investment. In any case, it is well established that growth and fluctuations
in small, isolated island economies are heavily influenced by the terms of
trade and supply-side disturbances, which is not to imply they are simply
passive victims of changes in the economic and natural worlds. Recent
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analysis confirms the importance of terms of trade shocks as far as Fiji's
business cycle is concerned (Cozier 1986, 186), while output trends are
best explained by terms of trade and investment trends, the latter in turn
reflecting international factors as well as domestic political and economic
uncertainties.
It is difficult if not impossible to establish the reasons for success or fail-
ure. Critics of planning and other forms of state intervention will assert
that they cause any recorded slow growth and that any fast growth occurs
in spite of them. Supporters of state involvement will assert that growth
would have been slower without intervention, and that fast growth occurs
because of it. Both groups will confidently predict future economic perfor-
mance on the basis of their preferred model. Thus Kasper and colleagues
have no hesitation in proceeding from the observation that the "socialist"
Labour-National Federation Coalition was even more interventionist than
the Alliance to the conclusion that therefore it would have worsened eco-
nomic performance (Kasper, Bennett, and Blandy 1988, 4; Cole and
Hughes 1988, 6). In fact, aside from the possibility that some intervention
might promote development, by the time the Coalition won office on 12
April 1987, Labour's ill-defined policies of undoubted radical intent had
been watered down (Lal 1988, 29). "The policy set out in the governor-
general's address at the opening of parliament on Monday II May ...
was not far from being Alliance policy" (Scarr 1988, 58). The conduct of
government in itself would have been a sobering learning experience.
What might have been in store we shall never know, for the new parlia-
ment did not see out the week.
THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF COLONEL RABUKA'S COUP
In the weeks following the 14 May coup, Fiji's economy was hit hard by
the flight of financial and human capital, a virtual cessation of foreign
investment, a collapse of .tourism, temporary trade union bans on trade
and travel from Australia and New Zealand, and a halt to the sugar har-
vest. The resultant balance of payments crisis necessitated draconian mac-
roeconomic policy measures that added to the unavoidable, but unequally
shared, hardship. Then, when it appeared that there was a chance of
establishing a government of national unity, a second coup occurred on 25
September and worsened the economic reversal by confirming the demise
of democracy and introducing a fundamental uncertainty over the stabil-
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ity and quality of political leadership. Official, probably conservative and
perhaps unreliable, estimates are that average real income fell 8.4 percent
in 1987 (Table 1). Unofficial guesses put the figure closer to 13 percent
(Kasper, Bennett, and Blandy 1988, 5). More worrying was the probability
that irreversible damage had been done to long-term development pros-
pects through chronic erosion of the economy's physical and human capi-
tal base. Real investment had fallen 42 percent (Browne and Scott 1989,
47, 49), and the educated, skilled, and entrepreneurial were leaving in
their hundreds.
A detailed discussion of events in 1987 is to be found elsewhere (Knap-
man 1988a), but the essential facts of the postcoup economic decline bear
repeating. Sugar production, also affected by a severe drought in the sec-
ond half of the year, was down 20 percent on the record 1986 level and
would have been down by another 8 percent but for a rise in the sugar :
cane ratio (RBF 1988, 20). Supplementary exports of 1986 sugar stocks
plus a recovery in the world sugar price generated a damage-containing 17
percent rise in foreign-currency export value (Browne and Scott 1989, 56).
Tourist arrivals were 26 percent down on the 1986 level despite ultralow
package deals offered in the wake of the first coup, causing a 23 percent
fall in gross tourism earnings for the year, which in turn contributed to a
26 percent fall in building and construction activity (RBF 1988, 37, 40). Net
tourism receipts were down by half, since not only did foreigners stay
away, but also more Fiji residents found the idea of an overseas holiday
attractive. Net private sector unrequited transfers on the balance of pay-
ments current account were four times the 1986 level due to increased emi-
gration and overseas remittances, while aid cuts caused a 25 percent drop
in net public sector inflows. The net outflow on capital account was F$58
million, over half from the private sector. Overall, the balance of pay-
ments deficit in 1987 was F$40 million, compared with a surplus of F$39
million in 1986 (RBF 1988, 89). Measured in Special Drawing Rights (the
IMF unit of account), the respective figures were 54.7 million (deficit) and
35.2 million (Browne and Scott 1989, 55).
This was the year-end result, despite a 33 percent devaluation of the Fiji
dollar and the adoption of restrictive monetary and exchange control poli-
cies aimed at containing the rundown in foreign exchange reserves and the
consequent pressures for creation of domestic credit. During 1987 the
Reserve Bank of Fiji raised its minimum lending rate from 8 percent to II
percent, ceased automatic commercial bank access to its rediscount facil-
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ity, removed interest-rate ceilings, suspended export finance at subsidized
rates, and imposed tougher penalty rates on banks using its credit. Ceil-
ings on commercial bank loans and advances were also introduced to fur-
ther restrict credit, but were not mandatory (RBF 1988, 53-56; Siwatibau
1988). The money supply growth rate fell markedly from 14 percent in
May to 4 percent in December (CES, July 1988), and commercial bank
maximum lending rates reached 24.5 percent (Browne and Scott 1989, 54).
Reinforcing all this were the devaluations of June and October, and a
(hopefully temporary) tightening of exchange controls on emigration
transfers, travel allowances, gift and dividend remittances, advance pay-
ments of imports, and repayments of offshore loans. Overseas portfolio
investment by residents was stopped.
Not all demands for credit could be refused, however, least of all those
emanating from the military government. With revenue from trade and
income taxes falling, and the army more than doubling its size from 2000,
the government's operating balance moved from a F$13 million surplus at
the end of March to a F$13 million deficit at the end of June-on its way
to an unprecedented 1987 level of F$53 million. The total deficit for the
year increased from a budgeted F$86 million to F$I09 million, and would
have been much worse but for a drastic F$37 million cut in capital expen-
diture, and September cuts in civil service and military wages and salaries
of 15 and 20 percent, respectively (RBF 1987b, 1987C, 1988). The fact
remained that a widening deficit had to be financed during a liquidity cri-
sis. As the former governor of the Reserve Bank observed, normally keen
international bankers "were keeping their distance" (Siwatibau 1988, 21),
and domestic demand from government securities, however high-yielding
they had become, had dried up. This left the Reserve Bank in its usual, but
now much bigger; role of "obligatory residual buyer of Fiji government
securities" (Luckett 1987, 105). In effect printing money, the Reserve Bank
bought most of the F$36.4 million in government securities issued in 1987,
and from its short term advance facility provided most of the F$34.7 mil-
lion in cash and deposits used by the government. A further F$30 million
was raised through private bond placements with the Fiji National Provi-
dent Fund, leaving F$8 million in overseas loans-primarily from multi-
lateral aid agencies-to make up the financing of the overall deficit. Thus,
a forced expansion in Reserve Bank credit to the military government
more than offset the effect of falling foreign reserves on the monetary base
of the banking system (RBF 198~, 56, 80). However, the net F$7 million
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expansion in the base had a reduced multiplier effect because of an
increase in the public's propensity to hold cash in times of political and
economic uncertainty.
By the end of I987 monetary restriction, devaluation, and mostly non-
military expenditure cuts had assisted in the restoration of external bal-
ance (Siwatibau I988, 22). But of necessity the assistance worsened the
recession. Between May and December close to 7000 people lost wage and
salary employment in the private sector, primarily in wholesale and retail
trade, restaurants and hotels, building and construction, and transport
and communications. More than one-third of those retaining job.s were on
lower pay, frequently along with shorter, more intensive working hours.
There was an increase of nearly 4000 in government employment, but this
reflected expansion of the army and concealed an exodus of skilled people
from public service. Given that the ranks of the unemployed had swelled
by over 7000, at least another 4000 people in the self-employed or new-
entrant-to-the-workforce categories could not find jobs, bringing the offi-
cial (conservative) estimate of the unemployment rate to IO.2 percent (RBF
I988, 50). The psychological and social costs of such rises in unemploy-
ment are well established and were evident in available data. Robberies
more than doubled, stimulating the conspicuous growth of the security
services industry. Violence against women increased. In Suva, hundreds of
families were added to the list of those seeking help from St Vincent de
Paul and the Bayly clinic. The Social Welfare Department was turning
away families seeking the destitute allowance of F$I8-40 per month (Bain
I988, 29-30). For those who did receive the allowance, the real assistance
it provided was being undermined by an acceleration of the inflation rate:
in December, the all-items consumer price index was up 9.5 percent on the
level of the previous year's end, and the food price index was up I3.4 per-
cent (RBF I988, 45).
Additional to the unemployment, underemployment, and pay cuts was
the general decline in health, education, and other services that resulted
from financial stringency and acceleration of the brain drain. Emigration
of Indo-Fijians proceeded at an average annual rate of I800 from I97I to
I984 and in the early eighties constituted 83 percent of all emigration.
Most of those leaving were yoiIng, in a professional, managerial or techni-
cal occupation, and bound for North America, Australia, or New
Zealand. One estimate suggested that one in every six skilled Indo-Fijians
working in Fiji in the early seventies was working in Canada at the end of
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the decade (Connell 1987, 21-24). After the coups the steady stream
became a torrent that, significantly, was fed by a new stream of skilled
Fijian emigrants. In mid-I988 it was reported that more than roo doctors,
up to 500 out of 6000 schoolteachers, almost half the country's 150 law-
yers, one-third of the accountants, and many other skilled people had left
Fiji (Islands Business, June 1988). By the end of 1987 the public sector had
lost 41 permanent secretaries and other senior officers among a total of
600 departures, compared with 255 in 1986 (Scarr 1988, 137). Altogether,
during the five months of August to Dec;ember, 2561 Fiji citizens departed
the country, of whom 2126 were Indo-Fijian (RBF 1987C). Combined with
budget cuts, such drains inevitably meant deterioration in services. In the
health sector, the loss of doctors, nurses and other support staff, rising
costs, and limited availability of some medicines seriously restricted cura-
tive work and "severely compromised" preventive and primary health care
programs (Mitchell 1988, 78). In education, teacher shortages were "par-
ticularly acute" in rural secondary schools and seriously affected Fijian
students (Baba 1988,13).
The year 1988 saw further economic decline as capital and people con-
tinued to leave Fiji, investors generally remained hesitant, and tourist
arrivals failed to grow (Fleeton and Dorrance 1988, 5-6). Real GDP is offi-
cially estimated to have fallen by 2.5 percent, but this seems too low in
view of the fact that the 1988 budget forecast was for a 6.5 percent decline,
which itself was plausibly judged to be half of the likely outcome by visit-
ing economists (Kasper, Bennett, and Blandy 1988, II-I4). The unemploy-
ment rate was approaching 20 percent while the inflation rate reached II
percent. And, as indicated in revised budget estimates, the government's
fiscal position worsened: the overall deficit of F$I22.7 million was 13 per-
cent up on the 1987 level, largely reflecting a further fall in income tax and
trade tax revenues, together with a 65 percent rise in debt service expendi-
ture. Capital expenditure was up a little because F$I4 million in cash aid
was expected from old donors like Australia and new major donors like
France in particular, who were prepared to lend money. One-quarter of
the financing of the overall deficit was to come from foreign loans, leaving
F$9I.5 million to be borrowed domestically (RBF 1988,80-84). This raised
a Latin American-style specter of an indebted government putting pres-
sure on the Reserve Bank to print money, thereby exacerbating balance of
payments and inflation problems and adding to the risk of a devaluation-
inflation spiral.
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The specter only loomed larger when, on I3 December I988, the oligar-
chy Rabuka restored to power presented its I989 budget. Total planned
government spending was reported as F$539 million, up I9 percent on the
I988 revised estimate. Capital expenditure was up 43 percent, and current
expenditure up I6 percent. Nominal civil servant salaries were increased
I5 percent (PIM, Jan I989). Customs duties on vehicles and parts, cloth-
ing, food, and other goods were slashed, an export tax on timber was
abolished, and no new taxes were introduced. Yet it was expected that the
total budget deficit would be close to the I988 level (Fleeton and Dorrance
I988, I3). For the required I9 percent increase in revenue, the government
was pinning its hopes on a forecast growth rate in real GOP of 3.5 percent,
or about II.5 percent in nominal terms, given expected inflation of 8 per-
cent. The implied elasticity of revenue with respect to nominal GOP was an
implausibly high I.65 (d. Collins I987, 26), which suggests greater reli-
ance on aid grants. In any case, the debt growth generated by borrowing
another F$I22.7 million will be serious enough-and will be worse if there
is no economic turnaround. The remaining task of this paper is to scruti-
nize Rabuka's October I987 claim that the economic crisis would only be
short-term (SMH, 8 Oct I987).
FUTURE ECONOMIC POLICIES AND PROSPECTS
Fiji's development challenges of the eighties and beyond were daunting
enough without the political instability and economic collapse engendered
by the military coups. Although growth at 4 percent was needed just to
hold the line on the unemployment rate, the I986-I990 development plan
suggested that anything less than 5 percent implied "a worsening of the
general social and economic conditions" (Fiji CPO I985, I4). From I989,
after two years of negative growth, it would take at least four years of real
GOP growth at 5 percent annually just to return average income to the pre-
coup level. What are the prospects of achieving such growth?
According to the economists who attribute the slow growth of the
immediate past to "rampant interventionism," if a statist development phi-
losophy prevents growth, its removal permits it.
The reforms we have in mind to launch Fiji into a scenario of recovery, pros-
perity and stability have three major components: a guarantee of civil rights
and economic freedoms, not so much by declaration and decree as by clear,
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consistent government actions and policies in support of such rights and free-
doms; a comprehensive, rapid repeal of regulations governing work, com-
merce, international trade and payments, saving and enterprise; and a slim-
ming down of the presently large government by reducing its functions and by
privatising many government entities. (Kasper, Bennett, and Blandy 1988, 63)
Put this package in place and a newly tapped reservoir of enterprising indi-
viduals will do the rest, investing in new, leading export industries like
garment and furniture manufacture. Use of a highly dubious growth
model suggests that in the period 1986 to 2010 an annual GDP growth of
6.5 percent and a tripling of average income are possible.
Unfortunately, there are several reasons why the fast-growth scenario is
utopian. First, even if the reforms were implemented, it is far from clear
that rapid growth would follow almost automatically. The government
has made positive contributions to past development, and it is not self-evi-
dent that a future reduction of its functions would on balance be growth-
promoting (though this is not to deny that there may be considerable
room for improving public sector efficiency). Similarly, and more impor-
tant, it is not obvious either that a sufficient surge of entrepreneurial spirit
would occur, or that adequate opportunities exist, for a dream of 6 per-
cent growth to come true. While there may be scope for export diversifica-
tion, the manufacturing sector-at 12 percent of GDP-is too small to
exert more than a limited influence on the growth rate of the economy as a
whole, even if it expanded rapidly. This is clear from an examination of
Table 2, which shows the target sectoral growth rates for an overall target
of 5 percent growth in GDP during 1986 to 1990: agriculture is optimisti-
cally expected to grow at 5.5 percent against the actual previous plan aver-
age of 3.4 percent, due to rapid growth in production of sugar, timber,
fish, cocoa, and tropical fruits; tourism is expected to grow at 6.3 percent;
and manufacturing growth is projected at 6.2 percent against an actual
previous plan average of 3.6 percent (Fiji CPO 1985, 14-16). To add another
1.5 percentage points to the overall growth rate, the nonsugar manufactur-
ing sector would have to expand at over 21 percent annually.
Anyway, the growth rates required of agriculture and tourism in order
to realize 5 percent GDP growth seem unachievable. Extension of sugar-
cane cultivation has reached its limits; cane transportation is a serious
constraint necessitating constant maintenance of tramlines, locomotives,
and trucks; the sugar : cane ratio has been on a downward trend; and
farm productivity has been falling as farmers with insecure tenure mine
Table 2. Projected Sectoral Rate of Growth in Terms of Gross Value Added at
Factor Cost, 1985-199°
Gross Value Added





Sugarcane 51.6 74.2 7.5
Other crops 37.5 53.3 7.3
Livestock 13.7 17.4 4.9
Fishing 15.5 22.3 7.5
Forestry 11.2 16.7 8.4
Subsistence 72.4 80.0 2.0
Mining and quarrying 10.3 16.9 10.4
Manufacturing
Sugar 25.1 36.7 7.9
Other food, drink, and
tobacco 48.2 67.4 6.9
Other manufacturing 75.4 96.5 5.0
Electricity, gas, water 24.4 31.9 5.5
Construction 90.2 115.7 5.1
Trade 229.2 293.2 5.0
Transport and communications 114.8 143.2 4.5
Finance, insurance, and real
estate & business services 94.2 129.5 6.6
Community and other services 328.3 390.2 3.5
TOTAL 1,242.0 1,585.1 5.0
Source: Fiji Central Planning Office 1985, 14.
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the land. These difficulties will intensify despite the once-for-all fillip from
devaluation. In tourism the conspicuous activity is the sale of existing
enterprises to overseas buyers like Japan's Electronic and Industrial Enter-
prises, not new investment; several airlines still choose to overfly the
expensive Nadi airport (Cole and Hughes I988, 87); and package holidays
can be riskier than in the days when Fiji was "the way the world should
be"-tourists are "known to have been raped" (Scarr I988, 87). Of course
international economic developments could be kind to the historically
leading sectors, but the outlook for I989-90 is one of world economic
slowdown. Long-term success is likely to hinge on a now-diminished abil-
ity to carve larger niches in competitive markets and to improve intersec-
toral link:;lges through encouraging greater inputs from agriculture into
tourism.
Even if rapid growth were achieved as a result of successful implemen-
tation of the proposed reforms, there would have to be concern over the
sustainability of the growth process. The fast-growth scenario implies that
distribution will take care of itself, presumably further down the track.
But although distributional conflict may be easier to control when the size
of the cake is getting bigger, the market system necessarily implies
inequalities; in the Fiji case, where values, customs, and institutions have
constrained involvement in commercial activity, it would inevitably fol-
low that in unfettered markets-including, it is recommended, one for
land-Fijians would be set at a relative disadvantage to Indo-Fijians. The
growth process could then undermine itself through the ethnic dishar-
mony it would create. It is precisely this problem, this difficult growth-dis-
tribution trade-off, which has plagued policymakers down the years and
which, unsolved, now provides fuel for those fanning the fires of racial
hatred.
Of related and overriding importance is the second reason to assess the
fast-growth scenario as utopian-on its own terms. The postcoup govern-
ment of Fiji has not established, and is not likely to establish, the political
preconditions for a return of confidence; it has shown itself to be more
interventionist than the chiefly-aristocratic predecessor of which it is a res-
urrected form, a practicer of the clumsiest forms of "positive" discrimina-
tion, and only a selective user of free-market rhetoric and policies. There
is no homage to Locke and Adam Smith· in Suva's present government
buildings, and there will be none in the planned new US$I.8 million par-
liament building (lB, Jan I989).
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Though the Singapore-style Internal Security Decree of June 1988 was
dropped in October of that year, soldiers still may arrest without warrant;
freedom of movement and association, and freedom of expression and
information are restricted; and insecurity remains the dominant factor in
Indo-Fijian and some Fijian and part-European lives. The new constitu-
tion promised for the end of 1990 will not remove this insecurity, enshrin-
ing Christianity as a state religion and disenfranchising Indo-Fijians,
urban Fijians, and, arguably, commoner Fijians as it does. Nor does it
guarantee the political stability helpful to growth. Most Indo-Fijians and
Fijians may be compelled to live with nondemocratic government, how-
ever reluctantly and warily in the former case. But with Indo-Fijians
"taken out of the political equation" (Saffu 1989), and the looming depar-
tures of Ratus Mara and Ganilau from the political arena, there is room
for Fijian conflict over control of the state to surface-between common-
ers and chiefs, westerners and easterners, and individual chiefs. There is
also the possibility still of armed resistance from an Indo-Fijian minority,
and a prospect of multiracial trade union versus state clashes. In short,
future political stability cannot be taken for granted.
On the government intervention front, discrimination became "legal"
withthe Fiji Service Commissions and Public Service (Amendment) Decree
of 1987, which required that all public service departmental heads be
Fijian, and that at least 50 percent of all other grades be staffed by Fijians
and Rotumans (APR, 30 Nov 1988; Scarr 1988, 137). The setting of a floor
like this ensures a higher figure will be achieved in practice, and gives pre-
cise meaning to Rabuka's stated intention to "chop out all the inefficient
[read Indo-Fijian] civil servants" (Dean and Ritova 1988, 14). It also sends
a signal to the private sector that has already been picked up: "All new
recruits of one multi-national corporate bank branch in Suva are ethnic
Fijian" (Naidu 1988, 9). The message to Fijians is clear: at least for a lucky
few, ethnicity will be rewarded rather than merit acquired with the special
assistance of more sensible affirmative action programs. The message to
Indo-Fijians is equally clear: you are not wanted. The response will be to
leave if possible.
Intervention was extended at the end of 1988 in the form of a Nine-
Point Plan that aims to achieve one-third Fijian ownership of the corpo-
rate sector by the year 2000, through achieving minimum ownership tar-
gets in "selected resource-based industries," and reserving unspecified
industries for Fijians exclusively. The required funds are to come from a
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Fijian holding company drawing on an A$I7 million interest-free govern-
ment loan and from a Fijians-only unit trust (SMH, 2I Nov I988).
Changes of ownership are not new investment, however; and plans like
this are likely to discourage Indo-Fijian, European, and overseas investors
without encouraging Fijian entrepreneurship, if the Malaysian experience
is anything to go by (Fleeton and Dorrance I988, 5; Kasper, Bennett, and
Blandy I988, I57-I6I; Economist, II Mar I989). Indeed, well-connected
Fijian politicians and civil servants will probably be the main benefi-
ciaries, not budding entrepreneurs, farmers, or workers. (Parallels with
Malawian civil servants owning tobacco plantations run by South African
managers come to mind.)
Other inefficient interventions include the use of the Army Auxiliary to
usurp the intermediary role. In defiance of economic logic, this is sup-
posed to raise prices to producers and lower them to consumers at no cost.
Further, Rabuka envisages an Auxiliary involvement in other commercial
enterprises, including production of chopsticks for export to Taiwan (IB,
Aug I988). Indeed, he sees an Indonesian-style "Army-controlled econ-
omy, for the time being, until we have recovered" (Dean and Ritova I988,
I28). Significantly, he went on to note "we are working on a Io-year plan."
The major evidence pointing to a superficially contradictory free-mar-
ket stance is the desperately deregulatory tax free zone policy, popular in
Marcos' Philippines, whereby the government grants companies I3 years'
holiday from the 37 percent company tax rate, tariff-free importation of
raw materials and plant, preferential energy charges, restriction-free over-
seas staff recruitment, freedom from minimum wage legislation, and free-
dom to repatriate profits-provided they export at least 95 percent of out-
put. Allegedly, 76 companies were approved up to late I988, but 27 were
local companies in business anyway, and only II of the 49 new companies
from overseas were actually operating (Fleeton and Dorrance I988, 5).
The overseas companies are likely to be footloose outfits that are attracted
by low wages and have to pay taxes at home if they do not pay in Fiji,
while the established local companies are clearly being subsidized by the
granting of tax-free status. In either case there is a loss to government rev-
enue. Such subsidies also distort investment decisions by discriminating
against businesses that may be efficient but do not qualify as zoneworthy,
as has been pointed out by the Fiji Employers' Consultative Association
(PIM, Dec I988). Nobody seems to have calculated the domestic resource
cost of earning foreign exchange by providing women and night-shift-
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working men in the zones with a job that transforms an unemployment
problem into a poverty problem. In terms of the impact on overall
growth, it has already been shown that simple arithmetic says tax free
zones cannot be the economy's salvation, a conclusion reinforced by inter-
national experience, which suggests that they "generally have not been
successful in promoting long-term investment and growth" (Fleeton and
Dorrance 1988, 5).
Finally, there are signs that some public enterprises may be privatized.
This is not the place for a detailed discussion of pros and cons, but two
pertinent observations can be made. First, as I have argued elsewhere
(Knapman 1988b, 57), "there is no theoretical or empirical foundation for
universal prescriptions either in favour of or against privatisation. In
terms of economic efficiency, type of ownership matters less than whether
or not market structure and the associated regulatory environment
encourage competition, and what the quality of the management response
is." Second, and related, competition is often not encouraged because
privatization can actually be a fiscal expedient: governments wishing to
raise revenue through asset sales have a vested interest in selling at the
highest possible price, and achieve this by effectively guaranteeing contin-
uation after the sale of any monopoly power. The fact that in practice
prices may be set too low, providing windfall gains to buyers, only serves
to confirm the suspicion that the government is acting in the private rather
than the public interest. This seems a likely outcome in the Fiji case, where
the fiscal balance is clearly precarious, and where the ruling elite is being
wooed by Japanese big business. Privatization will be a fire sale benefiting
foreigners.
One year after the first coup, a senior and internationally respected ex-
servant of the Fiji government wrote: "The outstanding issue for Fiji in
1988 and beyond is the rebuilding of confidence. This process will depend
upon moderate and sensible political developments and upon the re-estab-
lishment of a democratic system of government in which all sections of the
community feel comfortable" (Siwatibau 1988, 23). Regrettably, since this
was written there have been no signs that the political preconditions for a
restoration of confidence are being established. Instead, the military-
backed regime has shown its determination to walk away from the com-
plex but recognizable parliamentary democracy of the past-in the direc-
tion of oligarchy, racial discrimination, and forms of interventionism with
an adverse effect on economic performance. In consequence, the flow of
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capital and skilled people from Fiji has continued, and is likely to con-
tinue. Combined with the government's budgetary difficulties, this under-
mines growth prospects for the forseeable future. Aid in the form of
grants, loans, and technical assistance from expensive expatriates will fill
some of the gaps, but it will prop up a government that is a major cause of
the development difficulties confronting the country, and therefore will be
antidevelopment.
Sadly, there is a consensus on Fiji's future economic prospects in the
absence of confidence. Early in 1988 I wrote that "Fiji is well down a
familiar Third World path of repression, comparative economic stagna-
tion and rising unemployment" (Knapman 1988, 188). Cole and Hughes
end their monograph with the sentence: "Fiji will become a poor country"
(1988,87). Kasper, Bennett, and Blandy describe a scenario of decay and
emigration that "will probably produce a result similar to the shrinking of
living standards in Burma after 1948, Ghana since 1960, or Tanzania, with
occasional flashes of Sri Lanka- or Israel-style tension" (1988, 60). This is
one of the occasions when one hopes that the forecasts are wrong.
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